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In this paper, we argue that the legitimation of killing in war is not simply formed by adherence to certain 
legal requirements that exist apart from and prior to war; instead, we suggest, the law of armed conflict in 
itself cannot but operate through admitting certain materials onto the battlefield as distinctively legal 
materials. Using the theory of legal materiality, we show that the military uniform is a legal material that 
makes the legal matter of legitimate targeting intelligible to law. This process happens through the ways 
in which the uniform shapes the possibility of visual recognition and differentiation in order to make 
certain bodies targetable and others not targetable. We refer to this visual recognition and differentiation 
as a domain of persuasion. We show that the historical, functional and visual attributes of the uniform, as 
a design artefact, produce a convincing domain of distinction for the attacking agent. Finally, we turn to 
insurgency, arguing that the legal matter of targeting is shaped not only by the presence, use and 
manipulation of this legal material but also by the absence of it. 
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1 The Battle of Materials
In 1960 the CBS network broadcasted a 20-minute film titled ‘How 
to Kill People: A Problem of Design’. In the film, George Nelson, 
a well-known American industrial designer, presents an argument 
concerning the historical development of weaponry design. Beginning 
with prehistoric stone weapons and moving on to rocket launchers and 
nuclear bombs, Nelson shows how the distance between the operator 
of these weapons and those subject to their violence has expanded 
greatly as weapons have become more complicated. Describing the 
development from a simple stone to a stone club and then to a bow 
and arrow, Nelson states: ‘When the designer comes into the picture 
there’s a tremendous improvement in the product. It’s more interesting 
to look at. [The attacker] doesn’t have to move quite as close. And the 
force of the blow is greatly increased’ (1961: 47).
For Nelson, the bow and arrow is ‘the greatest of all inventions for 
separating the attacker from his victim’ (ibid). The efficiency in killing 
brought about by the practice of designing, which allows one to increase 
both destructive power and the distance between attacker and victim, 
reveals as a ‘silly myth’, Nelson says, the idea ‘that generals win wars. 
What the facts show is that designers do’ (ibid). Wars are won by the 
side that has more creative designers at its disposal. If one side has a 
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hand-held stone axe, the others only have a chance if they can design a 
helmet, and so on. From Nelson’s perspective, war is a battle between 
different materials and materialities, a confrontation between artefacts 
and other artefacts, that is driven by the political aims of a sovereign 
and configured through acts of design. Wars are struggles between the 
stone club and the iron helmet, between the bow and arrow and the 
shield, between the catapult and the castle, between the missile and 
the city. As such, the successful weapon designer is the one who allows 
soldiers and generals to move so far away from the battlefield that ‘we 
never see the white of their eyes again’ (ibid.). In this way, the ideal 
weapon system is the one whose user is not visible on the battlefield.
What Nelson’s reflections teach us is that the act of killing during 
war is always configured through the material organisation of the 
battlefield. This involves the employment of weaponry and equipment, 
but it also involves the use of signs, uniforms and technologies of seeing. 
The task of the law of armed conflict in regulating the characteristic 
activity of war – killing and destruction – is thus based upon the in/
visibility of particular objects and materialities. 
We contend that the legal requirements that legitimise killing in war 
are not external to the conduct of war and its technologies, materialities 
and practices. Instead, the law of armed conflict itself cannot operate 
but through the admission of certain materials as distinctively legal 
materials that are, in turn, enlisted in the production of lawful killing. 
We use the theory of ‘legal materiality as a mode of inquiry’ (Kang 
and Kendall, Introduction, 1) to understand the role of the specific 
materials involved in the production, mediation and negotiation of the 
law of armed conflict. Legal materiality
denotes the process or composition by which matters turn into legal 
concerns or problematizations through materials, such as texts, 
forms, formats, techniques, and physical and immaterial entities. This 
approach seeks to understand how different materials articulate and 
shape legal difference (Kang and Kendall, Introduction 4).
According to this perspective, different legal materials are 
assembled, or come into a relationship with one another, in a way that 
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transforms a matter into a legal matter and into a claim or argument 
through contingent acts of mediation. We refer to these mediations 
as ‘persuasion’, a particular concept borrowed from the f ield of 
design studies which has long been concerned with the materials 
and materialities of the world. The reference to persuasion here is not 
meant to suggest that these are rhetorical tools. It is rather a way of 
emphasising that historical usages, functions and aesthetic norms and 
forms give materialised things and artefacts the capacity to convince 
their users to use them in certain ways and thus to shape users’ actions 
and behaviour in the world. We believe that while materials can become 
the subject of law, and consequently legal materials, through an act 
of interpretation and/or mediation, not all materials are equally able 
to be discussed and analysed and to become legal materials. For this 
reason, we use the concept of ‘persuasion’ to point to the historical, 
functional, visual and physical capacities of an artefact that make it 
convincing as a legal material. It is the entanglement of law with the 
specific capacities of a designed object, an artefact, that qualifies that 
artefact and not others as a legal material. We advance this argument 
with reference to a specific legal material, the military uniform, and 
in relation to a specific legal matter: the principle of distinction and 
the concept of a legitimate human target in the law of armed conflict. 
Our argument proceeds in four steps. First, we provide a background 
discussion about how the law of armed conflict establishes a domain of 
persuasion in which targeting may take place through its requirement 
that certain signs and markers be used on the battlefield. Second, we 
highlight the military uniform as an important device through which 
the principle of distinction is operationalised. Third, we discuss how 
the uniform establishes an expansive domain of visibility that helps 
to produce the legal distinction between the categories of legitimate 
human target and civilian. This means that the battlefield is organised 
in such a way as to persuade the attacker, through the use of the visual 
and performative markers of the military uniform, that a specific body 
is a targetable one. Finally, we argue that, in the context of insurgencies, 
the absence of the legal material of the military uniform is compensated 
for by a complex technological apparatus of seeing and sensing; namely, 
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through drone warfare. Thus, the matter of distinction becomes a legal 
matter, as a principle, through the complex ways in which the existence, 
imposition, removal or imitation of a uniform persuades an attacker that 
some bodies are targetable and others are not. By showing how legal 
materiality operates in the context of the law of armed conflict in order 
to make legitimate killing possible, we make clear that it is not only the 
presence but also the absence of certain legal materials, like uniforms, 
that shapes the legal matter of targeting during wartime violence.
2 Making a World of Distinction through Materials
In the context of the law of armed conflict, the principle of distinction 
divides the battlefield into bodies and spaces against which lethal 
violence may be used (combatants and military objectives) and bodies 
and spaces against which lethal violence may not be used (the civilian 
population and civilian objects).
In relation to targeting, the principle operationalises the 
discriminate use of violence by relying on a series of materials that 
create and maintain distinctive visual markers of targetability. 
However, targetability is not necessarily conveyed by a single sign; it 
is a consequence of a particular configuration of materials of certain 
sizes, shapes and colours, and artefacts and sites, in a particular 
relation to other objects and entities present in an area of battle. These 
visualisations present sites and bodies within which the political and 
military willpower of parties to an armed conflict are concentrated; 
these are objects whose destruction will secure a ‘military advantage’ for 
one side (Additional Protocol I 1977, Art. 51(5)(b)) and force the other 
to yield to their adversary’s will (Clausewitz 2000 (1832)).
States’ presence on the battlefield is thus governed by detailed 
regulations concerning the dimensions, colours and materials used in 
the production of distinctive signs, flags, emblems and paintings on 
vehicles and weapon systems (Pilloud et al. 1987: 1143, Cauderay 1990). 
Such signs must be produced so as to be ‘as large as appropriate’ given 
the circumstances: ‘At night or when visibility is reduced, the sign may 
be lighted or illuminated’ (Annex I to Additional Protocol I 1977, Art. 
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17). Moreover, given that violence during war is constrained through 
such modes of visibility, national signs, uniforms and emblems must 
be communicated between enemies through diplomatic processes 
(Pilloud et al. 1987: 468). Here, an initial domain of persuasion is 
established through different materialities: the composition of flags, 
signs, emblems, logos and colouring.
Behavioural scientist B J Fogg (2002) has argued that technologies 
are inherently persuasive, meaning that they persuade their users to 
use them in certain ways as conceived by their designers. However, 
technologies need to be articulated and formed through useful and 
functionally designed products, services and systems in order to be 
persuasive to the intended users. The persuasiveness of technologies 
configured through concrete artefacts moves beyond the use and 
consumption of the artefacts and takes place within a larger framework. 
In this sense, the technological configuration of the world is not so 
much about the production of new and appealing products. Through 
their ability to generate behaviour, demand, expectation and ways of 
doing and being in the world, designed objects shape specific worlds 
in which only certain technological artefacts can make sense and be 
seen as useful and functional (Akrich 1992). Thus, persuasiveness is 
not a feature of technology but rather appears in its design (Redström 
2006). Any designed thing in the world, any configuration of materials, 
involves a level of persuasiveness, regardless of the complexity of its 
technological components. Artefacts carry with them certain ideas 
about their uses and contexts. They not only present and represent a 
certain point of view; they also act as an argument, in a materialised 
form, in favour of adopting that particular point of view. Signs, logos, 
emblems, colours, flags and uniforms turn the battlefield into a visual 
space of seeing, sensing and recognising. With different scales and sizes, 
uses, effects and outcomes they generate a world within which law can 
operate. The world configured through all these materials makes it 
possible for the attacking agent to be persuaded that certain bodies and 
objects are civilian and certain are military, and therefore targetable.
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3 Shaping Targetable Bodies through the Military Uniform
The principle of distinction, a foundational principle of the law of 
armed conflict, realises its matters – that is, human targets (combatants) 
and non-targets (civilians) – through the use of a specific artefact: the 
military uniform. 
In conventional wars, combatants are defined as legitimate targets 
by virtue of their role in the organisational structure of the modern state 
army. This membership in an organised armed force carries with it an 
obligation to wear a ‘fixed distinctive sign recognisable from distance’ 
and to ‘carry arms openly’ (Third Geneva Convention 1949, Art. 4).1 
As far as the law of armed conflict is concerned, without these visual 
requirements there cannot be an operable distinction between targets 
and non-targets, beside the very act of attack itself. The requirement 
of visual self-identification appears explicitly in Article 44(3) of the 
Additional Protocol I 1977:
In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the 
effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in 
a military operation preparatory to an attack.
This obligation of visibility is traditionally fulfilled by the wearing 
of distinctive military uniforms (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2005: 
90). The legality of lethal targeting depends on the fulfilment of two 
separate obligations by parties to an armed conflict, both of which 
depend on the visual functions of the uniform: (i) to make a distinction 
between the civilian population and combatants during an attack and 
(ii) to present one’s own combatants as targets to the adversary in a 
visibly distinctive manner.
The consequence of this linkage between the use of the uniform 
and the production of legal categories is that killing in war while not 
wearing a uniform and intentionally killing individuals who are not in 
uniform and not directly participating in hostilities both fall outside 
the bounds of lawful targeting. Visual indicators like military uniforms 
and/or other fixed and visible signs are the legal materials that make 
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the discriminate targeting of human beings concrete and operative. 
Even in those exceptional cases where combatants cannot make 
themselves visible by means of a uniform, they are required to engage 
in a minimum level of visibility by carrying arms openly (Additional 
Protocol I 1977, Art. 44(3)).
Understanding targeting through the materials informing the 
principle of distinction reveals the extent to which the military uniform 
is consequential for the law of armed conflict. However, this is not to 
say that the military uniform is the exclusive legal material for the 
extremely complicated practices and laws of armed conflict. While the 
military uniform creates a field of vision that organises killing, how 
this visual field is seen and what sorts of materials and technologies 
are involved in making sense of the entities seen within it are equally 
important issues. Seeing is a socially and technically complicated 
practice bound up with different visual cultures (Mirzoeff 2006, 
2011, 2015) and specific frames of persuasion offered by different 
technologies of seeing, such as audio-visual sensors, radars, thermal 
cameras, maps, aerial photographs, etc. We do not discuss all of 
these materials and technologies here, not least because others have 
already debated the regimes of visibility in war at length (Bousquet 
2018, 2009, Chamayou 2015, Wilke 2017, Gregory 2011, 2015). We 
focus on the military uniform because it has played a central role in 
the development of modes of visibility and invisibility within which 
many other technologies operate. As such, it has a direct link with the 
legal matter of the principle of distinction that other technologies lack.
First and foremost, a military uniform signifies that its wearer is 
subject to a kind of normativity that differs from that of civilian life 
(Guillaume, Andersen, and Vuori 2015: 56). It signifies that otherwise 
prohibited acts such as the arbitrary deprivation of life and assault are 
conditionally suspended. Moreover, uniformed members of an army 
carry out such acts with immunity from legal prosecution (Fleck 2008: 
81),2 so if captured they can enjoy the privileges of prisoner-of-war 
status (Third Geneva Convention 1949, Art 4). The difference made 
by the military uniform is best illustrated by considering the legal 
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consequences of the very same people committing the same violent 
actions but without wearing this visual signifier. If members of a state’s 
armed forces participate in hostilities while not wearing the uniform, 
they may be prosecuted for war crimes (Additional Protocol I 1977, 
Art. 37). They lose immunity from prosecution and cannot become 
prisoners of war. When it comes to the legitimisation of violence, the 
difference that the presence of the military uniform makes is expansive 
and decisive (Cf. Kutz 2005) – indeed, it is persuasive. One example 
that illustrates how the meaning of the legal categories of combatant 
and civilian derive from the visual functions of the military uniform is 
the International Committee of the Red Cross’s official commentary on 
Additional Protocol I (1977), which warns civilians against wearing any 
piece of clothing that resembles a military uniform in a conflict zone:
A journalist risks losing effective protection […] if he wears clothing, 
which too closely resembles military uniform, he will incur risks of 
a similar nature. In (this case) he therefore acts at his own risk: in 
exposing himself to danger in this way he would forfeit [civilian] 
protection de facto (Pilloud et al. 1987: 922).
Artefacts like the military uniform establish a larger interpretive 
framework, a world view that mediates a series of norms and values 
(Atzmon 2010) – here, legal ones. That is, any artefact produces a 
domain of persuasion. Persuasiveness is not only an inherent feature of 
a material’s physicality but also its history. The military uniform does 
not simply become a legal matter; a material becomes legal through the 
ways in which it gets called into law on account of its specific historical, 
functional, material and visual capacities. 
The reason that the military uniform, rather than other artefacts, 
became the central legal material for the law of armed conflict has to do 
with its various social, political and historical functions. Contemporary 
military uniforms are appropriations of historical practices of visual 
self-identification and distinctions such as the flamboyant attire of 
15th century German mercenaries, Landsknechte (Münkler 2004: 56), 
and the early 17th century practice of French soldiers wearing coloured 
cloth tied around their waists (Craik 2003: 131). The military uniform 
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as an organisational and logistical requirement of the professional army 
emerged with the ‘statisation of war’, the historical period in which 
modern nation states established themselves in part by creating armies 
of professional soldiers and ending the dependency of sovereigns upon 
mercenary forces (Münkler 2004: 55).
The military uniform possesses its material capabilities and 
attributes because it exercises disciplinary authority over the body of its 
wearer, a kind of authority fashion scholars refer to as ‘dress practices’ 
(Peoples 2014: 8). By externally communicating messages of chivalry, 
courage and patriotism, the military uniform creates what Jane Tynan 
(2013) calls the desirable image of wartime masculinity, and as such it 
acts as a means of attracting recruits. Internally and for its wearer, the 
military uniform is part of a disciplinary process of imposing tailored 
modes of action, manners and movements that are essential in order 
to create a professional army out of ordinary civilians (Peoples 2014: 
11) or, as Foucault puts it, to ‘get rid of the peasant and [give] him the 
air of a soldier’ (Foucault 1995: 135).
Thus, only an artefact like the military uniform, with its own specific 
capacities and attributes, is able to establish a larger interpretative 
framework, a domain of persuasion within which acts of legitimate 
targeting may take place. Without a legal material like the military 
uniform, the legal matter of distinguishing legitimate targets from 
illegitimate ones would not be intelligible to law.3 
4 Shaping Back the Legal Matter of Targeting
Once a legal material makes a matter of law concrete, it can also make 
possible other material practices that may persuade individuals to 
undertake actions or may suggest interpretations that were otherwise 
not possible, conceivable or permissible. Because it is a legal material 
connected to the permission to use or be protected against lethal force, 
the uniform is constantly reappropriated on the battlefield. A uniform 
can be taken off and replaced by civilian attire. One can also illicitly 
wear an enemy uniform, the uniform of a state not party to the conflict 
or the uniform of other protected entities, such as humanitarian 
NGOs, the UN or the ICRC. 
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The versatility of certain materials points to the historicity of their 
persuasive power as well as to the possibility of manipulating the world 
in which they operate. In February 2002, Médecins Sans Frontières 
reported that US special forces often operated in Kandahar wearing 
civilian clothing like jeans and T-shirts or Afghan civilian attire like 
a traditional Afghan scarf and Afghan hat (Pakol) instead of the US 
military uniform (Kelly and Rostrup 2002). Similarly, during a hostage 
rescue operation in 2008, Colombian armed forces posed as members 
of an imaginary humanitarian NGO, with some combatants displaying 
the emblem of the ICRC, in order to infiltrate a Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) military base. Consequently, the 
Colombian forces managed to rescue Ingrid Betancourt – a presidential 
candidate who was kidnapped six years earlier – and arrest the 
commander of the FARC military base (Brodzinsky and Davies 2008).
The possibility of using the military uniform in these deceitful 
ways shapes other parts of the law of armed conflict, which prohibit 
the perfidious use of the enemy uniform and the use of other protected 
signs, emblems or uniforms (Additional Protocol I 1977, Art. 37(1) and 
38(1)).4
The fact that the battlefield is organised through specific logics 
of visibility, as specified and reflected in the law of armed conflict, 
reveals that the legitimate human target, as well as the very idea of the 
legitimate use of violence, is constituted, preserved and made persuasive 
by visual and material markers, with the military uniform central 
among them. Like any other artefact, the military uniform is not only 
an instrument that passively achieves certain functions that are ascribed 
to it. It also shapes various levels of engagement, communication and 
mediation (see Buchanan 1989, Fry 2010). What makes the military 
uniform into the primary legal material for the operation of the law of 
armed conflict is not the fact that its role is universally agreed upon by 
all parties involved in war. Rather, it serves as a legal material because 
of the persuasive visual capacities it has by virtue of its seemingly simple 
yet also detailed, regulated, mobile and versatile materiality, which 
generates an expansive domain of persuasion within which targetable 
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and non-targetable entities can be seen and recognised.
Technologically speaking, the military uniform is unique in creating 
this domain of persuasion. There are two reasons for this. One concerns 
the self-identification and visualisation as an enemy target as opposed to 
a complete recognition of enmity by the adversary. The other concerns 
the separation of the means and processes of visual distinction from 
those of killing, meaning that the military uniform separates the 
act of killing from the act of recognising a target. The technology of 
killing and recognition are separated for the simple reason that the 
space between these two is the space of decision making, negotiation, 
evaluation and interpretation. This sort of negotiation happens, for 
instance, in cases where a uniformed solider is waving a white flag, or 
where a uniformed solider is hors de combat. The protected status of such 
soldiers is made possible by the preservation of a space between the 
technologies of killing and the technologies of seeing. What the artefact 
of the military uniform therefore does is to generate and maintain a 
domain of persuasion within which the principle of distinction can 
operate in a variety of different situations.
5 Coda: The Absence of the Uniform
Nelson’s film, discussed at the outset of this article, makes it clear that 
the distance between the user of weapons and those subject to their 
violence has expanded greatly at the same time that the designs of these 
weapons have grown more complicated. It also shows us that targets 
of destruction in wars are recognized and shaped through the material 
developments of the designed artefacts involved in destruction.
So far, we have shown that the domain of visualisation shaped by the 
use of a specific material, in our case the uniform, helps to persuade the 
attacker to kill by clarifying the distinction between legitimate targets 
and illegitimate targets. This is to say that we can take the introduction 
of the uniform as an introduction of new sets of ‘legitimised’ targets 
that were not previously aspects of the practice of war.
Whilst the military uniform helps to persuade soldiers to carry out 
the legal violence of war, one contemporary form of armed conflict, 
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i.e. counterinsurgency, is characterised by insurgents’ eschewal of the 
military uniform. Insurgents refuse to engage in any form of visual 
self-identification by refusing to wear distinctive clothing or signs.5 
In practical terms, insurgents seek to become invisible – at least until 
the moment of explosion or exchange of fire. The tactical value of 
invisibility lies, of course, in the persuasive function of the uniform’s 
visibility. The visibility of the uniform provides for an immediate 
recognition of enmity and targetability. Once the military uniform is 
gone, the persuasiveness that legitimises violence goes with it. As far 
as the law of armed conflict is concerned, ‘[i]n case of doubt whether 
a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian’ 
(Additional Protocol I 1977, Art. 50(1)). The insurgent’s refusal to wear 
a uniform while engaging in operations is a way of disrupting the 
domain of persuasion by creating a general condition of doubt about 
individual statuses. The result is that it becomes nearly impossible 
for the asymmetrically stronger counterinsurgents to use lethal force 
discriminately, and therefore legally. The legal matter at stake - that is, 
discriminate targeting in accordance with the principle of distinction 
- is rendered impossible in the absence of its material, the military 
uniform. This in turn suggests a need for other materials to serve 
this function. The rise of drone technology can be seen in part as a 
way of remaking the domain of persuasion that was once generated 
and sustained by the extensive use of military uniforms as means of 
operationalising the law of armed conflict. 
Therefore, the legal matter of wartime violence is shaped not only 
by the presence but also by the absence of legal materials like uniforms. 
While the complex visual and technical apparatuses of drone warfare 
have obviously changed the scale of visual production, this new type 
of warfare plugs into an already legitimised practice: ‘whoever wears 
the uniform is a targetable body’ now becomes ‘whoever appears on the 
screen as the result of data and pattern-of-life analysis is a targetable 
body.’ Other scholars have focused on the transformative effects of 
drones, whether moral (Alston 2010), geographical (Grayson and 
Mawdsley 2018, Maurer 2017), legal (Mégret 2012, Wilcox 2016) 
or political (Holmqvist 2013). We wish to push this line of argument 
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further by suggesting that drone warfare depends on a variety of 
materials that inform the practice of targeting. If one takes this claim 
seriously, then it becomes clear that the most important fact about 
drone warfare is that it is able to plug into the material trajectory of 
legitimate wartime violence and its legal categories. It can be argued 
that the production of the categories of combatant and civilian is a 
function of a regime of sensibility and of the interpretation of the visual 
field that materials such as drones, uniforms, and signs create (Wilke 
2017). However, such sensemaking and interpretation would not have 
been possible in the first place if it were not for the capacity of certain 
materials to contribute to the production of legitimate violence.
In 2001 the first US drone attack occurred in Afghanistan. A 
Predator drone filmed a tall, bearded man in a turban, towards whom 
three other men appeared to be acting reverently, and this footage 
appeared on some CIA drone operator’s monitor. The four observed men 
were in a former mujahideen camp in Zhawar Kili. Taken together, the 
location, appearances and behaviour of the men convinced the decision 
makers that the tall man in the turban was none other than Osama bin 
Laden (Sifton 2012). Soon after, it became clear to the Pentagon that 
this had not been the case. Pentagon Spokeswoman Victoria Clarke 
(2002) later conceded that the ‘tall man’ was not bin Laden, yet she 
added: ‘we are convinced that it was an appropriate target’, even though 
‘we do not know yet exactly who it was.’ It was later revealed that the 
individuals were villagers gathering scrap metal (Mayer 2009).
Targetable bodies have always been produced through the visualities 
afforded by materials, and the act of targeting these bodies is legitimised 
because these visualities manage to maintain an already established 
domain of persuasion: once you are configured by the legal materials 
of targeting, you are seen as a target.
Endnotes
1. The other two criteria for the combatant category are the existence of a 
hierarchical command structure and adherence to the laws and customs 
of war.
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2. Of course, they enjoy this immunity only as long as such acts are carried 
out in accordance with the principles of the law of armed conflict, such 
as distinction and proportionality.
3. We borrow this analysis from Kang and Kendall (Introduction), who argue 
that, ‘without legal materials, legal matters are not intelligible to law.’
4. It must be noted that not all manipulations of the visual regime of targeting 
are prohibited. Some are in fact permitted and are widely practised. A 
case in point is camouflaged uniform, which effectively serves to trick the 
onlooker into not seeing the uniformed combatant and yet is a permitted 
ruse of war (Additional Protocol I 1977, Art. 37(3)).
5. Note that depending on their objectives, the context and the stage of their 
development, different insurgent groups may behave in various ways. For 
instance, insurgent groups with self-determination as their objective or 
with aspirations of statehood often imitate the behaviours of organised state 
armies, such as wearing matching badges or uniforms. The point here is 
that the defining characteristic and general tendency of insurgent groups, 
as the asymmetrically weaker parties to armed conflicts, is nevertheless 
to avoid wearing visible signs and uniforms.
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